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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the application of organizational design principles to, and 
intergovernmental effort for, the provision of emergency management and 
homeland security services to a county comprised of twenty individual 
incorporated cities with a population of over 700,000.  A current lack of attention 
paid to these important factors has led to an emergency management process 
that does not provide the necessary level of collaboration or the efficient 
distribution of vital resources.  The premise is that the inclusion of special 
districts in the county’s emergency plans and response strategies will promote 
the optimum level of safety, security, and preparedness. Interoperable 
communications is presented as an area where an existing Joint Powers 
Agreement (JPA) can be more comprehensive and effective.  The thesis will 
examine the nature of a series of perceived challenges associated with this joint 
powers agreement as these factors apply to special districts and interoperable 
communications.  The paper also examines potential solutions to these 
challenges via the implementation of organizational design principles. 
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Portions of the current San Mateo County (CA) Emergency Services Joint 
Powers Agreement, which establishes a unified emergency services organization 
designated as the San Mateo Sheriff’s Area Office of Emergency Services and 
Homeland Security, are outdated and ineffective.  The agreement was developed 
prior to the events of September 11, 2001 and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
2005. The agreement does not adequately define goals or identify measurable 
and/or attainable results 
The growth of special districts within the county, especially with the 
presence of the San Francisco International Airport in the county, present unique 
challenges for the county’s Emergency Services Council.  This council, charged 
with oversight responsibility of emergency management efforts, has yet to 
adequately address the evolution of how public safety and additional core 
services are provided. 
The lack of attention paid to these important factors has led to an 
emergency management process that does not provide the necessary level of 
collaboration or the efficient distribution of vital resources.  Unless these 
important agencies are included in the county’s emergency plans and response 
strategies, the optimum level of safety, security, and preparedness will not be 
realized. 
This thesis presents the nature of the problems associated with the Joint 
Powers Agreement as they apply to special districts and interoperable 
communications.  It also examines potential solutions to these challenges via the 
implementation of organizational design principles.  Significant obstacles facing 
these alternatives are forecasted and listed.  Finally, the discussion will address 
how the potential solutions can address and overcome these potential 
roadblocks. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Portions of the current San Mateo County Emergency Services Joint 
Powers Agreement (JPA), which established a unified emergency organization 
designated as the San Mateo Sheriff’s Area Office of Emergency Services and 
Homeland Security, are outdated and ineffective.  The agreement was developed 
prior to the events of September 11, 2001, and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
2005.  It does not adequately define goals or identify measurable and/or 
attainable results (Yballa, 2009). In addition to issues raised by officials from 
several of the 20 municipalities located within the county, a 2005 investigation 
conducted by the San Mateo County Civil Grand Jury identified clear areas of 
concern (San Mateo Civil Grand Jury, 2005). Among the areas of concern 
identified in the grand jury report are the growth of special districts within the 
county, the lack of coordination with the San Francisco International Airport 
located in the county, and the inadequacy of law enforcement radio networks 
(San Mateo Civil Grand Jury, 2005). 
The San Mateo County Emergency Services Council is an 
intergovernmental entity charged with oversight responsibility of emergency 
preparedness and management efforts.  The council is comprised of elected 
officials from the county and each of the municipalities.  This council has yet to 
address adequately the evolution of how public safety and additional core 
services are provided. The challenges associated with the identified problem 
areas are the results of an ineffective form of governance. 
The lack of attention paid to the issue of governance has led to an 
emergency management process that does not provide for the necessary level of 
collaboration or the efficient dissemination of vital resources.  Unless all relevant 
parties are included in the county’s emergency plans and response strategies, 
the optimum level of safety, security, and preparedness will not be realized.  
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The grand jury identified the San Mateo County Office of Emergency 
Services and Homeland Security (OES) as the spearhead for the county’s 
emergency preparedness efforts (San Mateo Civil Grand Jury, 2005).  It noted 
the county’s relationship with the region, state, and nation as a valuable 
preparedness asset (San Mateo Civil Grand Jury, 2005). This is enhanced by 
OES’ access to grant funding and streamlined state and federal resources.  
While municipalities pursue their own preparedness efforts, they often lack the 
resources and robustness to address disasters of significant size.   
The San Mateo County Emergency JPA continues to support the 
preparedness needs of the county; however, the evolution of the manner in 
which public safety and additional core services are provided has made the JPA 
less relevant.  The shortcomings of the agreement must be recognized by the 
Emergency Services Council and acted upon.  These concerns extend beyond 
the logistical and practical issues associated with the inclusion of the many 
special districts within the county and the San Francisco International Airport.  
The real problem is that the JPA does not provide for the intergovernmental and 
inter-organizational collaboration necessary to support the county’s 
preparedness and security efforts.  A large contributor to this problem is the lack 
of participation and defined role of non- or quasi-governmental organizations 
essential to success in this area.  A move to include these entities and to explore 
alternate intergovernmental principles will face political challenges and financial 
obstacles.  Even so, the ultimate goal is to enhance the safety and security of the 
county’s residents.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The premise of this study is based on the belief articulated earlier in the 
chapter—specifically that portions of the current San Mateo County Emergency 
Services Joint Powers Agreement establishing a unified emergency organization 
designated as the San Mateo Sheriff’s Area Office of Emergency Services and 
Homeland Security are no longer effective or applicable in adequately addressing 
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the county’s needs.  The agreement was developed prior to national and 
international events that provide significant lessons that should be considered.  
Among these lessons is the ability to adequately define goals or identify 
measurable and/or attainable results. 
The growth of special districts within the county, challenges regarding 
interoperable communications, and the presence of the San Francisco 
International Airport, all present unique challenges for the county’s Emergency 
Services Council.  This council, charged with oversight responsibility of 
emergency management efforts, has yet to adequately address the evolution of 
how public safety and additional core services are provided. 
Based on these factors this research will address the following question: 
How can the implementation of organizational design principles be introduced 
into the San Mateo County Emergency Services JPA to increase its effectiveness 
and relevance? 
C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH    
The proposed research will apply existing literature support to affecting 
positive change to the JPA.  This documentation will assist in identifying gaps 
and shortcomings of the current intergovernmental agreement.  Additionally, the 
significance of this literature will be evident in developing a more forward thinking 
and applicable organizational design and structure aimed at increasing 
effectiveness.  A possible outcome of this project is the establishment of a 
foundation for future research regarding other local agreements involving 
emergency management.  This future research may address how best to 
integrate the private sector and nonprofit partners.  While this effort is specific to 
the needs of San Mateo County, the resulting principles and structure may 
provide a blueprint that will inform similar organizations at the municipal, county, 
and operational area levels. 
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The intended benefactors of this study are the citizens, public safety 
professionals, and local elected officials within the county.  The enhancement of 
the current organizational structure and an accompanying updated JPA will 
enhance the security of the citizens of San Mateo County.  Furthermore, it will 
afford decision makers at this level the ability and incentive to act in a manner 
that is fiscally responsible and that promotes the best interests of the county as a 
whole.  Homeland security practitioners at the state and federal levels may also 
realize the impact of potential changes.  The results of this study may illustrate a 
positive change at the local level, thus causing state and federal participants to 
make the necessary adjustments to accommodate these efforts. 
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The principal methodology used in developing this thesis was qualitative in 
nature.  By observing current and past behaviors associate with the San Mateo 
County JPA and by conducting a thorough literature review, the author has 
drawn conclusions based on grounded theories developed as a result of the 
research. 
This research is based on the premise that the existing policy document 
governing the intergovernmental organization is no longer effective.  A policy 
option analysis will be employed to evaluate where and how this policy document 
can be improved.  This method will include an objective and practical approach to 
developing effective options with an emphasis on the future success of the 
organization.  By developing alternative policy options and courses of actions, 
San Mateo County will be provided an avenue to move to the future in a sensible 
and efficient manner.  The intent is to develop, evaluate, and subsequently 
choose that course, or courses, of action that fill existing gaps and address 
current and future needs. 
This analysis will rely on the application of current and relevant theories 
and the creation of models that promote best practices regarding organizational 
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design as it applies to an intergovernmental organization and accompanying 
agreement.  The method will provide information and basis for identified 
alternatives and support for those determined to be most effective and relevant.  
Measurable results based on applicable theory and research will be developed to 
illustrate the value of chosen alternatives.  The analysis will combine a broad, 
objective perspective with a practical approach.  This perspective will include an 
acknowledgement of and consideration for the culture, values, goals, and 
interests of the organization and its stakeholders. 
The preliminary alternatives will include: 
• maintaining the status quo 
• the inclusion of San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and/or 
special districts as full participants within the JPA, and 
• the inclusion of SFO and/or special districts as associate members 
of the JPA.   
With respect to interoperable communications, alternatives will include: 
• abandoning the effort altogether 
• application of the JPA as a strictly fiduciary body, and  
• identifying the JPA as not only a fiduciary mechanism, but also the 
primary form of governance for the interoperable communication 
project within the county. 
The analysis of each of the identified alternatives will be measured based 
on established criteria.  This format will include effectiveness of services, fiscal 
responsibility, political feasibility, and sustainability/long-term impact.  The intent 
of the analysis is to determine the value of each option by measuring it against 
the listed criteria.  The goal is to arrive simply at measurable conclusions 







Table 1.   Policy Option Table 





     
     
     
     
     
*Categories measured using “poor,” “moderate,” and “strong” 
 
An overall assessment will be conducted following this analysis.  The 
desired outcome is that this method will result in the identification of the 
alternative, or alternatives, that will provide the best answer to the proposed 
research question and, ultimately, best serve the county in its emergency 
services and homeland security efforts. 
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II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
The intent of this review is to present applicable and relevant material 
regarding the effective governance of the San Mateo County Office of 
Emergency Services and Homeland Security (OES).  The purpose of the 
discussed sources will be to evaluate the applicability and effectiveness of the 
current structure and to discover areas where this structure could be amended or 
improved to enhance the existing form of governance.  The scope of this 
examination will include literature applicable to the organization’s inception in 
1963 through the present day.  An examination of sources during the course of 
this time will provide an understanding of the evolution of the organization and 
what steps are needed to ensure its relevance, effectiveness, and future 
success. 
Sources for this research were chosen to address the following 
categories: 
• Background information, including existing literature that legislates 
current structure 
• The role of special districts within the county’s homeland security 
and emergency preparedness process 
• The role of the San Francisco International Airport within the 
county’s emergency preparedness and homeland security structure 
• How to measure and increase the level of interoperable 
communication within the county’s emergency preparedness and 
homeland security process 
• How the implementation of organizational design principles 
throughout the San Mateo County Emergency Services Joint 
Powers Agreement increase its effectiveness 
The sources presented range from those specific to San Mateo County to 
those that discuss principles that may be applied to a similar intergovernmental 
organization.  These principles may be relevant to the needs and gaps within 
San Mateo County’s existing emergency services governance structure. 
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The document that currently provides a governance mechanism for the 
San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services (OES) is the Emergency 
Services Joint Powers Agreement (JPA).  The JPA is governed and administered 
by an Emergency Services Council. This council is comprised of one city council 
member from each city and a member of the county’s board of supervisors. This 
council approves budgets and provides strategic direction for OES (San Mateo 
County Emergency Services Joint Powers Agreement, 1997, p. 7).  This 
document will provide the foundation for necessary research and will be the 
focus of examination. 
Guidelines and the legislative authority that allows government agencies 
to enter into joint power agreements can be found in the California Government 
Code.  Specifically, section 6502 of the code states:  
If authorized by their legislative or other governing bodies, two or 
more public agencies by agreement may jointly exercise any power 
common to the contracting parties, even though one or more of the 
contracting agencies may be located outside this state. 
It shall not be necessary that any power common to the contracting 
parties be exercisable by each such contracting party with respect 
to the geographical area in which such power is to be jointly 
exercised. For purposes of this section, two or more public 
agencies having the power to conduct agricultural, livestock, 
industrial, cultural, or other fairs or exhibitions shall be deemed to 
have common power with respect to any such fair or exhibition 
conducted by any one or more of such public agencies or by an 
entity created pursuant to a joint powers agreement entered into by 
such public agencies. 
Section 6502.7 continues to address this issue by stating: 
(a) If authorized by their legislative or other governing bodies, two 
or more public agencies which have the authority to identify, plan 
for, monitor, control, regulate, dispose of, or abate liquid, toxic, or 
hazardous wastes or hazardous materials may, by agreement, 




(b) The contracting parties may provide special services, including 
persons specially trained, experienced, expert, and competent to 
perform these special services. 
(c) The provisions of this section are declaratory of existing law and 
do not limit any authority which already exists. 
Finally Government Code Section 6503 articulates, “The agreements shall 
state the purpose of the agreement or the power to be exercised. They shall 
provide for the method by which the purpose will be accomplished or the manner 
in which the power will be exercised.” 
In 2005, the San Mateo County Civil Grand Jury conducted a 
comprehensive examination of the state of the county’s emergency 
preparedness capabilities.  The grand jury’s investigation included research in 
the areas of community preparedness, the readiness of public schools, the 
readiness of public transportation, and interoperable communication.  Among the 
grand jury’s areas of concern were the role of special districts and the county’s 
relationship with SFO as it pertains to disaster planning and response (San 
Mateo County Grand Jury, 2005, p. 13).  The report prepared by the grand jury 
will serve as a preliminary outline in identifying gaps in the current governance 
agreement.  The grand jury report is just one external variable that influences the 
direction of the organization in question. Additional factors include the homeland 
security grant process and the regulations and governmental bodies within 
neighboring jurisdictions.  Considering the actions and input from this type of 
external stimuli provides for an understanding of otherwise perplexing steps that 
may or may not have been taken. For this reason, resources from agencies such 
as the Bay Area Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI, 2009), California Special 
Districts Association, and the Municipal Code and Charter for the City and 
County of San Francisco may prove very enlightening. 
A basic structure for an emergency management organization is 
presented in the United States Federal Highway Administration’s Security and 
Emergency Management: An Information Briefing for Supervisors and Managers 
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in State Departments of Transportation (2010).  While its source may at first 
appear unrelated to this subject matter, this document presents a solid 
foundation in identifying roles within security and emergency management as 
well as articulating a mission and concept of operation. These principles remain 
consistent in all areas of emergency management.  The Public Entity Risk 
Institute’s Characteristics of Effective Emergency Management Organizational 
Structures suggests a self-assessment approach when measuring the relevance 
and applicability of an organization similar to OES (2001).  The guidance 
provided by this source will likely help in developing the framework necessary to 
address principle and design issues within the study.  The development of 
essential characteristics, based on numerous case studies, will be valuable in 
evaluating the existing form of governance and directing an amended, more 
applicable structure.   
The issue of training remains very important to this discussion.  In order to 
succeed, change must be accompanied by some type of education, orientation, 
or practical training.  Because training is included in the mission of OES, its 
relevance is even greater. Two practical sources provide structure, guidance, 
and a baseline by which to measure a training plan or program.  These sources 
include the California Emergency Management Agency’s (CalEMA) California 
Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) and United States Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).  
Both resources provide for a measurable standard by which to establish and 
evaluate any training endeavor in the field. 
When Do Organizations Need to Change (Part I)? Coping with 
Incongruence presents an appropriate discussion regarding identifying how an 
organization should recognize when change is necessary (Diedrich, 2003).  This 
resource discusses the ability of an organization to adapt and uses a design 
process based on models focused on coordination and performance.  The 
contextual aspect in this piece provides for a universal applicability that can be 
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useful within several different types of organizations including the subject of this 
study.  The need for change within the current county’s approach is discussed 
within San Mateo County Operational Area Joint Powers Agreement Update Plan 
(Yballa, 2009).  The suggestions and recommendations within this document 
convey a lack of thorough understanding of the joint powers concept and this 
specific agreement.  However, is does accurately identify areas for improvement, 
including the need for revision and a regional approach to response and 
recovery. 
A realization that change is necessary is not always readily accepted.  
Often a reluctance to change exists even when faced with overwhelming 
evidence that it is required or inevitable. The psychology of an organization plays 
a tremendous role in its progress. Existing relationships, past experiences, and a 
fear of changes all contribute to a sense of apprehension when any type of 
change is proposed. For example, Clizbe’s The Psychology of Terrorism; The 
Response of Relief Organizations to Terrorists Attacks speaks to the needs such 
as support, linkages, and information associated with dynamic of group 
interaction and change (2007).  In The New Global Insecurity, Moghaddam 
(2010) addresses perceived inequalities related to what he describes as the 
“resource crunch.”  Moreover, ideas concerning intergroup contact, 
adaptiveness, and pre-adaptiveness from Moghaddam’s How Globalization 
Spurs Terrorism are extremely applicable to this discussion (2008).  Similarly, 
Currao addresses many of the same issue when discussing the emergency 
mangers role in facilitating trust in a challenging environment (2009). 
The important relationship between structure and mission described in 
Inducing Adaptation in Human Organizations: Concept and Experiment Design 
will be helpful in providing direction for this study (Entin, 2004).  There are two 
relevant aspects to this source.  Initially, the process of realizing when the 




effecting change.  Additionally, the method for amending or changing the 
structure to fit the mission is essential in implementing the appropriate design for 
the organization.   
An important aspect of this study is the incorporation of special districts, 
some being nonprofit groups, within OES’ organizational structure.  Predicting 
Organizational Crisis Readiness: Perspectives and Practices toward a Pathway 
to Preparedness provides a comprehensive view of the effective inclusion of the 
private sector and nonprofits within the emergency management community 
(Light, 2008). In addition to emergency management, OES is responsible for the 
county’s homeland security needs.  Moving Toward More Capable Government: 
A Guide to Organizational Design examines the restructuring of an organization 
with a homeland security slant (Stanton, 2002).  This source is unique in that it 
seeks solutions to problems at the federal level that are applicable at the local 
and county levels.  It provides interesting homeland security related concepts 
and approaches that would likely prove beneficial at the county level. 
While not intended to serve as a case study, this examination will look to 
other organizations for models that may be appropriate within the existing 
environment.  Such examples can be found in the Caribbean Disaster 
Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and its Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM) Regional Organization for Standards and Quality 
(Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency [CDEMA], 2011).   
The Department of Homeland Security’s Communication Interoperability 
and Compatibility Program (SAFECOM) Science and Technology Directorate is 
an outline of the emergency responder interoperability discussion 
(Communication Interoperability and Compatibility Program [SAFECOM], 2006).  
This document clearly defines the problem, identifies goals and provides a 
strategy to reach those goals.  The SAFECOM program provides for a strong 
starting point in examining interoperable communications within this context.  
Specifically, the winter 2007 issue of the program’s publication Interoperability 
13 
 
Technology Today includes articles entitled Disaster Management 
Interoperability Services Improves Emergency Response Collaboration 
(Interoperability Technology Today, 2007, p. 1) and Baseline Survey Identifies 
National Interoperability Capacities for Nation’s Emergency Responders (Boyd, 
2007, p. 2).  These articles address communication problems faced by 
emergency services organizations at every level and provide clear options. 
The focus of this research is not technical and not aimed at addressing the 
“nuts and bolts” of how interoperability systems are to be integrated.  Rather, it 
focuses on the important component of governance and how it can be most 
effective in enhancing interoperability.  The National Association of State Chief 
Information Officers’ We Need to Talk: Governance Models to Advance 
Communications Interoperability examines important factors, including culture, 
the establishment of a governing body, political considerations, authority, 
developing partnerships, and coordination (2005).  The case studies included in 
this report provide relevant examples to nontechnical issues involving 
interoperability.  The same issue is addressed in the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Coordination and Partnerships: Awareness Guide.  This publication 
resists the temptation to focus on technology and examines how interagency and 
intergovernmental coordination can improve regional interoperability 
communication performance (Public Safety Wireless Network Program 
Coordination and Partnerships, 2003a). 
Among the most exciting sources within this research is presented by the 
Public Safety Wireless Network.  This entity’s Special Services District 
Interoperability Report incorporates an interoperability discussion that is focused 
on special districts and nongovernmental organizations (Public Safety Wireless 
Network Program, 2003b). This report addresses central themes of this research, 
including coordination with public safety agencies and data collection and 
sharing.   
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The sources discussed within this review combine to address two 
significant issues regarding the level of preparedness and security in San Mateo 
County.  Specifically, this material assists in identifying gaps and shortcomings in 
the current homeland security and emergency preparedness governance 
structure.  It continues to provide strong case studies and theories that are 
applicable to an amendment or replacement of the design of the 
intergovernmental process that currently exists.  As San Mateo County strives to 
maintain a high level of security and preparedness for its citizenry, the manner in 
which it provides these services must evolve to meet new demands and address 
ever-changing variables.  The material presented in this review will likely provide 
for an ideal blueprint in preparation of a relevant and effective emergency 




A. ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION 
The San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services (OES) was 
established in 1963 as an independent county department to serve the then 
440,000 county residents (Board of Supervisors, 1963).  In 1997, emergency 
management responsibilities were transferred to the Sheriff and the San Mateo 
County Sheriff's Area Office of Emergency Services was formed, evolving into 
the Office of Emergency Services and Homeland Security following the events of 
September 11, 2001.  This agency is currently funded through a Joint Powers 
Agreement (JPA) among 20 incorporated cities and the County of San Mateo 
itself (refer to Appendix A).  The contribution amount of each city to the JPA is 
based upon a formula that includes the population and average assessed 
property value. The county then matches the funds contributed by all of the cities. 
The remainder of the OES budget is comprised of state and Federal Emergency 
Management Assistance (FEMA) program funds (Joint Powers Agreement, 
1997).  Today’s San Mateo County population is approximately 750,000 (Census 
Bureau, 2009). 
The JPA is governed by an Emergency Services Council. This council is 
comprised of one city council member from each city, and a member of the 
county’s board of supervisors. This council approves budgets and provides 
strategic direction for the JPA (Joint Powers Agreement, 1997). 
OES is staffed with a sheriff’s lieutenant who serves as its director, one 
sheriff’s sergeant, one sheriff’s deputy, and four district coordinators as full time 
personnel.  An additional 17 sheriff’s deputies perform ancillary duties for the 
agency on a part time basis.  The OES staff provides planning and training 
services to the 20 cities in the county. Currently, all 20 cities in San Mateo 
County have emergency plans that are compliant with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and the Standardized Emergency Management 
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System (SEMS). OES provides an ongoing training program for city and county 
employees on NIMS and SEMS (OES Memorandum, 2008). 
The organizational charts for the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office and 
the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services and Homeland 
Security are listed in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.   San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office Organizational Chart (From San 














Figure 2.   OES Organizational Chart 
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B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION’S MISSION, GOALS, AND 
OBJECTIVES 
The current OES mission statement sates: 
The mission of the Area Office of Emergency Services is to provide 
planning, preparedness, public information, training, and Federal/State 
intergovernmental emergency services coordination for the twenty cities/towns 
within San Mateo County, as well as for County government, to enable them to 
respond to, minimize the impact of, and recover from, a major emergency, 
disaster, or homeland security incident with the least possible loss of life or 
property.  The Hazardous Materials Emergency Response Program provides a 
team of trained Hazardous Materials specialists who respond to and manage 
HazMat emergencies and potential bio-terrorism threat throughout San Mateo 
County on a seven-day, 24 hour basis (Joint Powers Agreement, 1997). 
In an effort to achieve its stated mission OES has developed the following 
focus areas. 
1. Planning 
OES assists all cities and the county with annual an annual review and 
update of Emergency Operations Plans (EOP).  The agency consults with and 
assists the cities and county with Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
preparedness.  Finally, the agency provides local support to the cities in 
conducting all-hazard assessments. 
2. Training 
OES conducts standardized training for all regional public safety agencies 
in NIMS, SEMS, and the Incident Command System (ICS).  This training includes 
orientation, the role of the executive, and field response.  The agency is a 
charged with coordinating EOC procedural training, hazardous materials training, 
explosive ordinance disposal, weapons of mass destruction, and tactical counter-
assault training for first responders.  Specialized emergency management 
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training is often facilitated through FEMA and the California Emergency 
Management Agency’s (CalEMA) California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) 
(CSTI, 2010). 
3. Public Preparedness Programs 
The agency has developed numerous community outreach programs that 
seek to educate the public in the field of emergency preparedness.  The 
programs include a Website, community events, and marketing via all media 
outlets.  Strong relationships have been established with community groups, 
schools, churches, and business groups in the community.  
4. Exercises 
OES is responsible for the coordination of countywide emergency related 
exercises.  It has subscribed to the federal guidelines within the Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) (HSEEP, 2010).  The 
agency assumes the lead role among local organizations when participating in 
state, regional, and national exercises.  Furthermore, OES is often requested to 
assist local municipalities with their own EOC or disaster related drills and 
exercises. 
5. Emergency Response 
An OES duty officer is on call 24 hours a day to respond to disasters, 
emergencies, and critical incidents.  Under the direction of the Incident 
Commander (IC), the duty officer is required to provide logistical support, prepare 
Incident Action Plans (IAP), and assist in providing public and media information.   
The Hazardous Materials Team (HazMat), Explosive Ordinance Disposal 
Unit (EOD), and the Terrorism Counterassault Team (TCAT) respond throughout 
the county to conduct hazardous entries, address tactical weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) threats, conduct sampling and testing, provide for safe 
disposal, and complete the required reporting to state and federal agencies. 
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Eleven additional units, including an air squadron, marine unit, and high 
angle rescue unit, respond throughout the county and state as requested.  OES 
serves as the mutual aid coordinator for the San Mateo County Operational Area 
(Joint Powers Agreement, 1997). It is required to communicate with the region 
and state in order to adhere to all mutual aid and emergency reporting protocols. 
6. Communication 
Under the existing JPA, OES is responsible for the maintenance of all law 
enforcement mutual aid channels.  The agency also maintains a microwave link 
with all cities and hospitals. OES staff coordinates with local 911 centers during 
critical incidents and emergencies.  
7. Specialized Equipment 
OES maintains a large amount of specialized equipment ranging from fire 
apparatus and tactical vehicles, to mobile light standards and generators.  
Communication vehicles, radios, mobile command centers, and personal 
protective equipment are all made available to county agencies via OES. 
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IV. THE GOVERNING INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT 
A. THE JOINT POWERS AGREEMENT AND GOVERNANCE 
The lack of attention paid to the field within the county has led to an 
emergency management process that does not provide for the necessary level of 
collaboration or the efficient dissemination of vital resources.  Unless these 
important factors are included in the county’s emergency plans and response 
strategies, the optimum level of safety, security, and preparedness will not be 
realized by the county or their partner municipalities. 
In 2005, the San Mateo County Civil Grand Jury conducted a 
comprehensive examination of the state of the county’s emergency 
preparedness capabilities.  The grand jury’s investigation included research in 
the areas of community preparedness, the readiness of public schools, public 
transportation, and interoperable communication.  Among the grand jury’s areas 
of concern were the role of special districts and the county’s relationship with 
SFO as it pertains to disaster planning and response (Grand Jury, 2005). 
The grand jury identified questions in an effort to determine whether the 
existing JPA satisfied the county’s emergency management needs. The report 
made reference to the JPA, which is described in the report as an agreement 
between municipalities and the county that “does not include special districts as 
voting members” (Grand Jury, 2005, p. 13).  The JPA does reference special 
districts as partners; however, with the exception of police and fire services, their 
inclusion and participation has been extremely limited (Joint Powers Agreement, 
2007).  Very few special districts have adequate disaster plans, and most special 
districts do not have preparedness agreements or procedures established with 
the local governments whose services they supplement.  In addition, a significant 
disconnect exists between these districts and local municipalities.   
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B. ROLES, OBLIGATIONS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS 
Municipal participation is essential to successful countywide preparedness 
and readiness effort.  This participation is not always easy to secure and, when 
available, is often accompanied by specific localized agendas rather than a broad 
view.  All involved must arrive at the realization that their respect roles and 
obligations to the safety and security of the county are largely based on risk. 
The assessment and prioritization of homeland security risks within San 
Mateo County are directly related to a regional collaborative effort to address the 
same risks to the San Francisco Bay Area.  This relationship is one of both 
necessity and accuracy.  Requirements mandated within the Bay Area Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) make a cooperative approach necessary to ensure 
access to the funding required to assist in mitigating or reducing identified threats 
(DHS, 2010).  Additionally, partnerships developed with local, state, and federal 
agencies provide essential resources that facilitate the capability to conduct an 
accurate and thorough assessment.  Additional benefits realized as a result of 
participation in this process are an enhanced awareness of the “big picture” and 
a greater understanding by local entities of regional threats.   
The county is mindful of the framework established by state and national 
government that calls for the setting of security related goals, the identification of 
key resources and critical infrastructure sites, the assessment of risk, the 
prioritization of risk, the implementation of developed programs, and the 
development of a process to measure the effectiveness of implemented 
programs (DHS, 2010).  The process often poses significant challenges as 
information obtained from assessments conducted at individual sites, or for 
individual groups, is analyzed to form a comprehensive countywide assessment. 
The San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services and Homeland 
Security adheres to a fairly standard methodology when defining or measuring 
risk.  This process includes three variables: threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence.  The threat component provides for the likelihood of an event 
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occurring.  Vulnerability serves as the county’s susceptibility to a specific 
scenario.  Consequence evaluates a worst-case scenario considering human, 
economic, mission, and psychological effects (Bay Area UASI, 2010b, p. 4).  
When conducting an assessment of an individual site or asset, the 
CARVER/Shock method is the norm (U.S.  Department of Agriculture, 2007, p. 
2).  This method includes examining the criticality, accessibility, recuperability, 
vulnerability, effect, recognizability of the site, and the combined health, 
economic, and psychological impact of a potential attack. 
This approach has proved very effective when applied to individual assets 
or sites; however, it is not as useful a tool in assessing homeland security risks 
as a whole.  This is primarily due to the fact that the evaluated asset or site is not 
examined within the context of additional locations that contribute to solidifying 
the county and region’s infrastructure.  This type of assessment accurately 
illustrates the risk to the site, but it fails to articulate how the condition contributes 
to the risk assumed by the community.  Prioritization, as listed in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, is the piece missing from this limited approach 
(DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan).   
Municipalities within the county have fallen into the same “trap.” Their 
narrow focus is a symptom of a much larger issue.  Until all participants are 
willing to view their security and preparedness role and obligation as that of a 
more regionally focused project, limited progress can be expected.  The inherent 
interdependence that exists among critical infrastructure sites and the key 
resources throughout the county must be acknowledged so that governments 
can invest wisely, responsibly, and with frugality.  The latitude afforded to this 
type of investment will be realized when a more regional strategy is adopted, 
allowing for the sharing of resources and a more appropriate level of response. 
In an effort to assume a more comprehensive approach to risk 
assessment and management, the county and its external partners in the Bay 
Area have established a system that includes the monitoring and understanding 
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of threats, prioritizing, and the ability to update strategy through action.  
Understanding the nature of risks enables risk managers to forecast potential 
problems and to implement appropriate preventative measures.  This process as 
a whole allows the organization to validate the risk and to measure objectively 
the county’s existing capabilities.  The validation of a risk offers the opportunity to 
gain a better understanding of its drivers, such as threat, vulnerability, or 
consequence factors. Assessing capabilities is as simple as assigning a level 
(low, medium, or high) to a desired capability.  A comparison of a risk validation 
and a capabilities assessment provides for a gap analysis that can accurately 
point to where attention should be focused.  These steps lead to probably the 
most difficult portion of the risk management—establishing prioritization criteria. 
San Mateo County has joined a regional effort to utilize a standardized 
prioritization guide to establish priorities effectively within a risk management 
program.  Twenty–five areas have been identified as key resources or critical 
infrastructure areas (refer to Appendix C) (Bay Area UASI, 2010a).  
Consequence types associated with risk are assigned to each of these areas.  
Each consequence is assigned a numerical value based on established criteria.  
Listed in Table 2 is a matrix containing an example of the prioritization criteria for 
commercial facilities for public assembly (Bay Area UASI, 2010a). 
Table 2.   Risk Metric 
Consequence 
Type 
Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4 
Economic 
Loss 
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Example NFL Stadium Coliseum Mega Church High School 
Stadium 
This matrix illustrates the process for which consequences of greater 
significance are assigned scores of one or two.  The implementation of this 
standardized method allows for critical infrastructure sites to be viewed within the 
context of the entire community in order to realize fully their relevance and level 
of importance.  It should be noted that for this process to function correctly, 
subject matter experts are required to ensure that each consequence type is 
assigned an appropriate numerical value.  This approach is not unlike FEMA’s 
approach to mitigation planning, although colors are used to illustrate severity 
rather than numerical scores (FEMA, 2001). 
As a result of available regional and federal resources, San Mateo County 
has made significant strides in assessing and prioritizing homeland security risks 
within its operational area.  This effort has resulted in a greater collaboration with 
the national and bay area governments.  Furthermore, it has afforded the county 
the ability to remain acutely aware of those risks experienced by neighboring 
entities and to have its own areas of risk recognized and incorporated into 
regional risk awareness and management programs.  The county’s efforts are 
also consistent with a majority of the principles listed in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (DHS, 2010c). 
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While it has been effective, San Mateo County’s approach to risk 
assessment and management is not without its flaws.  Among those flaws is an 
omission of an open discussion that identifies what an acceptable level of risk is.  
Dr. Willis’s presentation to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
emphasized the importance of seeking the public’s input on homeland security 
issues and the prioritization of associated risks (GAO, 2008, p. 17).  If the public 
is going to be an active participant in such a dialogue, it must be granted access 
to relevant information.  The San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services 
and Homeland Security is overseen by an Emergency Services Council that 
holds open meetings on a quarterly basis (JPA, 1997, p. 5).   
Furthermore, community outreach programs and events are held on a 
regular basis reinforcing the importance of preparedness; however, the public 
conversation described by Dr. Willis is not incorporated in the current approach.  
Nor is the public provided with appropriate information or an appropriate forum to 
facilitate such a dialogue.  A contributing factor to this lack of dialogue is an 
obstacle described by Dr. Willis.  This involves a reluctance of politicians to focus 
on long-term issues and recognize ever-changing risks and risk levels (GAO, 
2008, p. 18).  The Emergency Services Council is comprised of local elected 
officials from municipalities within the county (JPA, 1997, p. 6).  These politicians 
are often driven by vocal constituents whose views and desires may not coincide 
with validated risks.  No matter how successful and thorough the assessment 
and prioritization of risk is, it is occasionally discarded by elected officials who 
have additional priorities not associated or related to risk. 
Partnership challenges among the public and private sector described by 
Dr. Willis are experienced within San Mateo County (GAO, 2008, p. 22).  Initially, 
expectations held within the private sector are not often shared by county 
government.  This occurs for two reasons.  One, the goals of the private sector 
are based on bottom line considerations.  This concern becomes a major factor 
for industry when assessing risk.  The government often loses sight of this aspect 
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and makes independent decisions that will likely have a detrimental effect on the 
private sector’s ability to flourish.  A second reason for this disconnect is simply 
communication.  Both the public and private sector tend to develop policy and 
make decisions without consulting with one another.  These programs are often 
well thought out and would likely succeed if they had been developed in a more 
cooperative environment.   
An additional partnership challenge is based on reliance.  Government 
and the private sector need one another if they are to successfully mange and 
reduce risk.  Public entities are granted the legislative authority to develop and 
implement policy; however, the resources necessary to make these programs 
successful are often held by private entities.  The private sector relies on 
government to develop and implement effective and appropriate policy, often 
based on risk.  Government relies on industry to provide for the resources 
necessary to “buy down” and manage risk. 
Finally, the county approach to risk management fails to provide for a 
process to measure its effectiveness.  This important component is the only area 
for the National Infrastructure Protection Plan omitted by the county’s regional 
risk management actions (DHS National Infrastructure Protection Plan, p. 2).  An 
attempt is made within the UASI funding process, in the form of milestones, to 
address this problem. Unfortunately, these procedures address individual 
projects and do not examine the assessment of risk as a whole.  Without this 
valuable feedback and evaluation, it is premature to comment definitively on the 
current county’s risk management approach.  The lack of participation of the 
public, the private sector, and the cities themselves may not allow for an accurate 
measure.  However, should these groups be included in measuring performance, 
their lack of current input would likely be realized and addressed. 
San Mateo County’s approach to assessing and managing risk is difficult 
to comprehend.  The ability to work with national and regional partners has 
provided tremendous opportunity to mitigate both local and regional risk.  The 
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ability to prioritize these risks has solidified the county’s position within the region 
as related to homeland security.  It has also contributed to the region and state 
through data sharing and standardized prioritization criteria.  Unfortunately, little 
progress has been made in including municipalities, the public and private 
industry in the process.  This challenge is compounded by the fact that the 
relevant elected officials do not share the same concern regarding the omission 
of these groups.  The first step in addressing this problem is for all participants to 
acknowledge their own obligation and duty in measuring and mitigating risk 
regardless of jurisdictional lines.  This may lead to a greater clarification of roles. 
C. THE CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE EXISTING POLICY 
DOCUMENT 
Many view the existing county agreement as simply a funding document.  
Very little credence is given to the Emergency Services Council’s ability to make 
policy decisions.  Some may not even be aware that the council exists at all.  
While this perception is not accurate, it does contribute to the effectiveness of the 
homeland security and emergency management process within the county.  
Contributions to the JPA are considered similar to an insurance policy by many 
municipalities.  This insurance policy mentality contributes to a realistic response 
expectation during a critical incident and a lack of interest in planning, training, 
and exercise.  It may be comforting to believe that because a check is written on 
annual basis that all emergency management needs have been met; however 
this is far from the case.   
The existing JPA effectively excludes special districts from the information 
collection and intelligence dissemination process.  Because several of these 
districts provide services across jurisdictional lines, this exclusion will likely result 
in a lack of coordination, inefficiency, and a duplication of information collection 
and sharing efforts.  These are significant consequences to this type of 
disconnect; however, it can be argued that under the existing agreement, no 
such collaboration is permitted.  While this may not be the intent of public safety 
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agencies and community leaders, their reluctance to review and discuss the 
revision of policy does send the message that they are content with the status 
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V. ABSENT STAKEHOLDERS AND RELEVANT POTENTIAL 
CONCEPTS 
A. SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 
The San Francisco International Airport (SFO) is owned and operated by 
the city and county of San Francisco.  Over 30 million travelers pass through 
SFO each year (OES Memorandum, 2008). The fact that this airport is located 
within San Mateo County requires that agencies within the county plan and 
coordinate their response to emergencies.  The presence of the airport elevates 
risk and enhances vulnerabilities within the county.  On the other hand, the 
airport makes valuable resources available to the county in emergency and/or 
disaster situations.  Via OES, the county and SFO have entered into several 
mutual aid agreements.   
Despite these agreements, SFO is not included as a member of the 
county’s Emergency Services Council.  The San Francisco Police Department 
provides basic police services to the airport and enforces the security plan 
established by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (OES 
Memorandum, 2008).  The San Francisco Police Department also provides for 
the individual security of airlines and assumes a prominent position within SFO’s 
disaster response capabilities.  The San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office is 
responsible to investigate all reports of criminal activity at SFO and also plays a 
role in its response to critical incidents.  The San Francisco Fire Department 
provides fire protection, emergency medical services, training, and fire prevention 
at SFO (OES Memorandum, 2008). 
At first glance, SFO’s emergency management relationship with OES 
appears to be fairly solid.  The county and SFO are currently mutual aid partners 
in several areas including: 
• SFO relies on county hospitals for surge capacity in the event on an 
incident at the airport. 
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• SFO has a joint agreement with the San Mateo Department of 
Public Health regarding the protection against and treatment of 
communicable diseases. 
• SFO conducts an annual air crash exercise involving county first 
responders. 
• Fire agencies at SFO and within the county are available to assist 
one another when necessary (Grand Jury, 2005, p. 19). 
These strengths are accompanied by areas that leave significant room for 
growth.  The problem areas include: 
• Most of the agreements listed above are fairly informal and not 
accompanied by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) or other 
type of agreement. 
• SFO has a positive, yet informal relationship with OES. 
• Overall emergency planning in the county is the primary 
responsibility of sheriff and OES which is funded through a JPA and 
governed by the Emergency Services Council. 
• SFO is not a member of the JPA or represented on the Emergency 
Services Council. 
B. ADDITIONAL SPECIAL DISTRICTS  
In addition to the 20 incorporated cities, 24 special districts (refer to 
Appendix B) are also located in San Mateo County.  These districts provide 
specific services to designated populations within the county.  Most often, these 
districts are associated with police, the fire service, water, sanitation, health, or 
resource conservation.  The type of services provided by these districts are 
consistent with those provided at the department level within larger 
municipalities.  Many of the services provided by special districts are critical to 
the county’s ability to respond in the event of a disaster.  For example, instances 
of a large fire, flood, storm, epidemic, riot, or earthquake would involve a high 
level of interaction and cooperation among OES and these districts.  California 
defines a special district as an “agency of the state (created) for the local 
performance of government or proprietary functions within limited 
boundaries.”(California Special Districts Association, 2010)   
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As such, a special district is a form of government that delivers a specific 
service within a defined geographic region.  Districts are often created as a result 
of an insufficient tax base or competing demands for public funds that make it 
difficult for a municipality to provide an essential service to its citizens.  When 
residents, property owners, or local government desire a new service or an 
enhanced level of an existing service, they may choose to form and fund a 
special district to provide it to them.  Like most special districts in the state, the 
special districts within San Mateo County are independent and have their own 
board of directors or commission that are elected by the voters (San Mateo 
Guide to Government, 2010).  While these districts remain accountable to the 
voters in their designated areas, they are also subject to critical oversight by 
state and county governments.   
During the course of its examination, the Grand Jury developed a question 
that asks, “To what extent are special districts in San Mateo County prepared to 
respond to a disaster” (Civil Grand Jury, 2005)? 
As mentioned earlier, a 2005 grand jury report made reference to the JPA, 
which is described as an agreement between municipalities and the county that 
“does not include special districts as voting members” (Civil Grand Jury, 2005).  
The JPA does reference special districts as partners; however, with the 
exception of police and fire services, their inclusion and participation has been 
extremely limited.  Very few special districts have adequate disaster plans.  Most 
special districts do not have preparedness agreements or procedures 
established with the local governments whose services they supplement.  A 
significant disconnect exists between these districts and local municipalities.   
Inadequate communication channels have contributed to deficiencies in 
the coordination among special districts, municipalities and OES.  Existing 
communication problems include: 
• The lack of a common communication frequency in the county and 
funding to maintain it. 
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• A lack of uniformity in the radio equipment used countywide. 
• The fact that special districts cannot access the county’s mutual aid 
radio network. (Civil Grand Jury, 2005) 
These preliminary observations indicate that the preparedness level and 
capabilities among special districts in the county could be significantly improved. 
C. INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS 
With regard to interoperable communications, the grand jury proposed 
questions directed at how the current level of interoperability can be enhanced as 
well as how the county can best prepare itself for mandated changes to public 
safety radio networks, including narrow banding (Grand Jury, 2005, p. 27).  
These problems are due, in part, to a lack of consensus among stakeholders in 
accepting and adopting specific technology and communications systems.  
The digital radio communication network used in San Mateo County was 
completed in 2004 at an approximate cost of 24 million dollars (Grand Jury, 
2005, p. 27).  The county’s Information Services Department (ISD) maintains the 
system that is used primarily by county departments including the Sheriff’s Office, 
Public Works, and the Health Department.  The system is extremely resilient and 
capable of accommodating a large number of additional users.  There is a 
significant cost associated with the purchase this system for both 
receiving/transmitting stations and mobile radios.  These costs include new 
hardware, software, enhanced towers, and prolonged maintenance 
requirements.  Current users of this system pay a fee based on the number of 
mobile and portable radios in use.  As a result of these associated costs, 
municipal agencies are reluctant to upgrade to digital technologies resulting in 
many more analog receivers than digital receivers in the county’s most populated 
areas.  The county, via the Emergency Services JPA, continues to maintain four 
analog mutual aid channels for large events and interagency law enforcement 
communication within the county itself.   
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In addition to the county’s digital system, the 20 municipal police 
departments continue to employ older analog communications systems.  Some 
of these agencies share radio channels resulting in at total of 17 existing analog 
frequencies that serve as primary law enforcement channels (Public Safety 
Communications).  All municipal fire agencies within the county have recently 
consolidated their communication and operate using three primary VHF analog 
channels (Public Safety Communications).  Over the last 15 to 20 years, 
municipal agencies have invested in adding additional analog receivers in the 
field to support an increased used of portable and mobile radios.  The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has mandated that the width of public 
safety radio frequencies be reduced to 12.5 kHz by January 1, 2013 (FCC, 
2010).  The municipalities within San Mateo County are working independently to 
satisfy this requirement.  Each city is confident that its respective analog system 
will continue to operate at a satisfactory level following this change.  However, 
the first phase of an additional narrow banding requirement to 6.25 kHz is 
scheduled for 2017 (FCC, 2010).  This deadline has been established for public 
safety 700 MHz radios only.  The timeline for the VHF and UHF frequencies has 
yet to be established.  It is unlikely that existing systems will be able to function 
with this future adjustment.   
Regardless of federal mandates and timelines, the true measure of 
interoperable communications is how it can increase the effectiveness of first 
responders in their response to critical incidents.  Several recent incidents have 
illustrated the need for a serious shift toward regional interoperability. 
• On Thursday, July 8, 2010, and Friday, November 5, 2010, San 
Mateo County deployed a countywide mobile field force to Oakland, 
California to assist with instances of civil unrest.  These incidents 
were as a result of a verdict and sentencing of a Bay Area Rapid 
Transit (BART) police officer charged with murder and convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter.  These mobile field forces were 
comprised of approximately 70 personnel from the 21 law 
enforcement agencies within the county.  At the time of each of 
these deployments, no San Mateo County agency possessed the 
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ability to communicate with agencies outside of the county via 
radio.  In fact, many officers were unable to communicate with 
agencies located within the county.  As a result, the operation relied 
on “radio swapping” with the Oakland Police Department.  Available 
resources allowed for only a fraction of deployed personnel to 
communicate effectively with the Oakland Police Department.  This 
inability to communicate posed major logistics challenges and 
presented significant officer safety concerns. 
• On Thursday, September 9, 2010, the City of San Bruno, located in 
the northern part of the county, experienced a major gas line 
explosion and subsequent fire.  This incident destroyed a large 
portion of an entire neighborhood and required the response of 
every law enforcement and fire agency in the county.  An analog-
based law mutual aid channel was employed to manage the 
incident and the fire agencies were able to communicate via there 
established analog channels.  However, the ability to communicate 
across disciplines was nonexistent.  Nine years after September 
11, 2001, the fire service and law enforcement were still operating 
completely independent of one another, even with the published 
relevant findings of the 9/11 Commission (9/11 Commission, 2004).   
• On Monday, November 1, 2010, a San Mateo County Mobile Field 
Force was deployed to San Francisco, California to assist with civil 
unrest following the San Francisco Giants’ World Series victory.  
Once again, an appropriate level of communication did not exist 
and the exchange of portable radios was necessary.   
There are three primary contributors to the challenge of interoperability for 
San Mateo County.  The first is a lack of confidence in transitioning to a digital 
system accessible via the Project 25 (P25) platform (DHS, 2010d).  This is based 
on early problems experienced within the county during the initial implementation 
of a digital system. The second factor is cost.  Municipalities view the cost of 
such a conversion to be unreasonable and not feasible, especially in a trying 
economic environment.  The final contributor is a lack of established governance 
that would provide an opportunity for collaboration and direction for an evolution 
to a more interoperable working environment.   
In 2007, the Redwood City Police Department joined the San Mateo 
County Sheriff’s Office in transitioning to a UHF digital trunked radio system.  
During the implementation phase of this project, several problems were 
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encountered.  The most glaring of these were issues with the reliability of 
portable radios.  As the level of dissatisfaction grew among officers, the labor 
union became involved in a very public debate with the department’s 
administration.  As a result, the department returned to its analog system, leaving 
the Sheriff’s Office as the only agency in the county employing the digital trunked 
system.  Regardless of what their true objections are to a digital system, the 
other municipalities in the county have pointed to Redwood City’s experience as 
a reason not to make a transition.  After three years of evolving technology, this 
example is cited regularly as a reason for hesitancy in moving toward regional 
interoperability. 
The county has taken strides to illustrate the value of interoperability.  It 
has invested in portable and fixed interoperable devices to both enhance the 
level of the county’s response capabilities and to encourage its county partners 
to take their own steps in improving communications.  The graphic in Figure 13 
illustrates how the current interoperability device works when deployed.  A 
drawback to this approach is that it is not timely and requires additional 
personnel in the field to establish and maintain an adequate level of interoperable 
communication.  Additionally, a great deal of technical expertise is required to 
deploy this system resulting in an extremely limited number of personnel with the 




Figure 3.   Interoperability Device (From Federal Communications Commission, 
2010) 
The hesitancy to move toward a more interoperable system includes the 
lack of perceived need.  The examples listed earlier in this study were instances 
where the lack of communications capabilities were realized the most by the 
Sheriff’s Office.  It is the Sheriff’s Office that is responsible for deploying mutual 
aid assets regionally and handling large critical incidents within the county.  
Therefore, the lack of capabilities in this area is not always fully appreciated by 
smaller cities.  San Mateo County is located in an area susceptible to several 
types of natural disasters, including earthquakes, wild land fires, floods, and even 
tsunamis.  Additionally, it is home to the San Francisco International Airport and 
major regional infrastructure sites associated with water, power, technology, 
communications, and transportation.  The inability to communicate with 
significant partners such as San Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose is 
concerning.  The chart below illustrates the county’s current level of regional 
communication, or lack thereof. 
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The indirect communication indicated in the chart between San Mateo, 
San Francisco, and Santa Clara Counties only pertains to the San Mateo County 
Sheriff’s Office.  What is evident in this diagram is that San Mateo County is 
much less prepared to communicate regionally in a time of crisis than many of its 
neighboring counties.   
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A. APPLICATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
In his master’s thesis, Battalion Chief Thomas Currao of the New York 
City Fire Department examines relationship factors including inter-organizational 
trust and leadership characteristics and their relationship to enhancing 
collaboration among emergency responders during critical incidents (2009, p. 1).  
Citing communication, planning, and logistics examples from New York City’s 
emergency response capabilities, Currao (2009) claims that a lack of cooperation 
and collaboration is a systematic flaw among first responder agencies.  Currao 
makes the additional claim that this flaw extends to exercises that cross agency 
and jurisdictional lines (2009).  His view is that such exercises are a playing field 
for responding agencies to compete with one another rather than to build 
stronger relationships and a higher level of response (Currao, 2009).  Currao 
identifies problems with planning, information sharing, and a failure to adopt a 
“task force mindset” as contributors to the problem of collaboration (2009, p. 2). 
Currao’s position is based on the assumption that collaboration among 
emergency responders contributes to a greater effectiveness (2009).  He 
supports this need for collaboration by examining the theories and applications of 
complex adaptive systems (Currao, 2009, p.3).  The environment Currao 
described is different from that in which emergency personnel regularly operate.  
Instead, complex adaptive systems present the emergency manager with distinct 
challenges and opportunities that require collaboration among agencies in order 
to realize success (2009).  Currao supports participation among agencies in an 
interdependent network in response to a significant event, such as a terrorist 
attack.  His belief is that such a network will result in collaborative solutions 
where emergency response agencies will be able to rely on one another to assist 
in reaching agency specific goals and objectives (Currao, 2009, p. 6).   
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Currao’s main premise centers on the concept of trust and its role within 
collaboration (2009).  The author’s primary argument is that maintaining 
relationships based on trust is necessary in the response to threats to local, 
regional, state, and national security.  To support this claim Currao presented the 
thesis’ research question that asked: “How does trust influence the 
development and implementation of inter-organizational collaboration 
involving those agencies that have a participatory role in homeland 
security preparedness, response, and recovery operations within New York 
City [emphasis added]” (Currao, p. 8)? 
From an organizational standpoint, Currao’s research reveals a value to a 
collaborative intergovernmental approach as opposed to a traditional hierarchical 
model (2009).  The research supports the collaborative approach’s association 
with greater communication, innovation, the ability to shift resources quickly, and 
the flexibility to meet new demands (Currao, 2009, p. 13).  Currao identifies trust 
as the foundation for a collaborative working environment where agencies allow 
themselves to rely on expertise and resources outside of their own control.  His 
thesis also identifies the many aspects of homeland security, including 
intelligence based policing, fusion centers, and emergency management as 
being more heavily dependent on trust and collaboration than those in other 
fields.  This is due to the inclusion of several different agencies and levels of 
government and there need to conduct consolidated operations and implement 
wide reaching policies effectively (Currao, p. 16).   
Currao (2009) also applies trust and collaboration to the principles 
associated with leadership.  This is completed by examining attributes associated 
with complexity leadership, adaptive leadership, and transformative leadership.  
The author arrives at the conclusion that leaders must possess and be able to 
use effectively skills such as persuasion, conflict management, crises 
management, and the ability to promote social networks among homeland 
security networks (Currao, 2009, p. 19). 
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A portion of the research methodology employed in developing the thesis 
was a series of interviews with representatives from five different agencies within 
New York City and a representative from a federal organization (Currao, 2009).  
The eight scripted questions for the interviewees included: 
• What factors would you identify as fostering or diminishing the 
ability of agencies to coordinate operations and work within a 
collaborative fashion? 
• Does the element of trust influence the development and 
implementation of inter-organizational collaboration and 
coordination? 
• Now that you have identified trust as an element, how do you 
define trust within the emergency management process? 
• How do you differentiate between trust in representatives of an 
agency versus the organization that they represent? 
• In what ways do you feel that trust building between organizations 
may lead to increased effectiveness of response, problem solving, 
capacities, and the utilization of limited resources? 
• How do you feel trust plays a part in modern day challenges, such 
as responding to or planning for acts of terror? 
• What strategies, or programs, can be implemented to develop and 
foster trust between agencies? 
• Is there a leadership role in establishing trusted relationships? Do 
those agencies that have as their mission the coordination of 
emergency services, play a role in the establishment of trusted 
partnerships? (Currao, 2009, p. 23) 
Trust and collaboration were repeatedly identified by the respondents as 
necessary elements to an effective approach to security related issues.  The 
interviewees expressed a desire to form stronger relationships with their 
emergency response partners.  There was a strong consensus among all 
participants that trust and collaboration at every level is an essential component 
of emergency response. 
As a result of the described research, Currao provides five 




These recommendations include: 
• Multi-disciplinary training and education 
• Realistic training / revised exercise program 
• Enhanced communications 
• Joint Operations Team 
• Study limitations and future research. (Currao, 2009) 
Currao concluded that the implementation of these recommendations 
would result in a greater understanding of agency cultures, reduced level of 
competition, greater level of information sharing, increase of effectiveness of 
applying expertise, and the elimination of isolated response and planning efforts 
(2009, pp. 92–98). 
From an emergency manager’s perspective, the assumptions and 
conclusions arrived at by the Currao (2009) are appropriate.  One of the greatest 
challenges within emergency management is securing cooperation and 
collaboration among entities whose preference is to plan for, and respond to, 
incidents independently.  Accordingly, the concept of trust plays a tremendous 
role in facilitating this collaborative process.  The difficulty in New York City, with 
regard to interagency trust and collaboration, is not unique.  These same 
challenges exist 3,000 miles away in Northern California.  The concepts and 
ideas presented by Currao (2009) are shared by emergency managers and 
responders throughout the nation.    
The intent of this research is to improve the quality of the organization at 
all levels.  A review of other relevant organizations often offers interesting 
options.  For example, an examination of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency 
Management Agency (CDEMA) provides insight into how San Mateo County’s 
existing structure can be improved (CDEMA, 2011).  The value of this 





CDEMA is comprised of 16 Caribbean nations and is governed by an 
intergovernmental body granted authority by an intergovernmental agreement 
(CDEMA, 2011).   
Each of the members of CDEMA is represented on its governing body 
(CDEMA, 2011).  Furthermore, the purpose of CDEMA includes managing large-
scale disasters, mobilizing resources, mitigation efforts, recovery, education, 
training, preparedness, and public awareness (CARICOM, 2011). From a 
geographical point of view, it may not be to scale; however, the structure and 
missions of both organizations make for an applicable and relevant comparison. 
Similarities do not exist throughout the entirety of the two organizations.  
This is initially evident in the governing documents themselves.  The county JPA 
fails to include valuable quasigovernmental or nongovernmental partners.  
Among the most valuable at the county level are special districts that are already 
charged with providing essential services on a regular basis.  In contrast, the 
CDEMA agreement includes specific mention of similar organizations at the 
national and international level (CDEMA, 2011).  This agreement addresses the 
inclusion of nongovernmental organizations within two specific areas. Initially, the 
agreement specifically identifies these organizations by separating them into six 
groups.  These groups include Regional Response Organizations, Donor 
Agencies, Specialized Technical Agencies, National Disaster Organizations, 
Private Sector Organizations, and Other Resource Organizations (CDEMA, 
2011).  The specificity in identifying these groups assists to articulate clearly their 
respective roles within disaster response.   
A second area where the CDEMA agreement addresses nongovernmental 
participation is an allowance of a more formal inclusion.  This agreement affords 
its governing body the authority to enter into formal agreements with 
nongovernmental entities (CDEMA, 2011).  This allowance enables CDEMA to 
include all partners formally within its response and management plans.  
Additionally, it also encourages collaboration and consistency among 
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government plans and those of partner agencies.  At this point, no such latitude 
is granted to county’s emergency services governing body under its existing 
agreement.   
Structure is another component that separates the county from that of the 
CDEMA.  While they share a very similar form of governance, the manner in 
which their response structures are established is different.  CDEMA has taken 
its 16 jurisdictions and effectively created four regional groups.  Four of the 16 
members are selected based on location, size, and capability to serve as the 
head of these regional groups.  In the case of CDEMA, the nations of Antigua, 
Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago have been selected to lead their 
respective groups (CDEMA, 2011).  This format helps to overcome the 
challenges mentioned earlier in this report associated within information 
management and resource distribution.  Within San Mateo County, there are 
three large cities located at the north, central, and south regions of the county 
including Daly City, San Mateo, and Redwood City.  The location, size, and 
robustness of these cities make them ideal candidates to assume the same role 
as those nations leading regional groups within the CDEMA structure.   
The common characteristics shared by these two organizations make their 
respective footprints, although not to scale, extraordinary similar.  This 
resemblance makes a comparative examination useful to San Mateo County for 
evaluating its existing structure and policies.  An effective intergovernmental 
document, the inclusion of essential nongovernmental partners, and an 
established structure that provides for a consistent, efficient, and effective 
response are all areas in which CDEMA has progressed on an international level.  
Similar progress on a smaller level has slowed to a crawl in San Mateo County.  
Scale and scope is less relevant in this instance than identified needs, goals, and 
objectives.  The consistency among these three factors within this comparison 




The California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) applies a 
similar approach to managing incident that affect the entire state or large regions 
within it.  Rather than establishing one funnel to receive and distribute 
information from the state’s 58 county operational areas, CalEMA has separated 
the state into seven regions (CalEMA, 2010).  From a management perspective, 
this provides a solid communication structure that facilitates information and 
resource management.  In essence the 58 county EOC’s communicate with their 
respective Region EOCs (REOCs) who then communicate with the State 
Emergency Operations Center (SOC).  San Mateo County may be well served in 
considering the application of the principles within the CDEMA and CalEMA 
models in managing their own critical incidents and information sharing efforts. 
 
Figure 4.   CalEMA Management Regions (From CalEMA, 2011) 
An adoption of this type of model would not come without challenges. It 
would require a level of intergovernmental cooperation the county has not yet 
experienced.  For example, during the course of a disaster or similar critical 
incident circumstances may call for an administrator from one jurisdiction making 
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policy or resource related decisions for a neighboring jurisdiction.  There are 
significant political and fiscal ramifications associated with this; however, this 
challenge can be addressed through planning and continual conversation and 
exercise.  Ideally, parameters would result that would prevent the inappropriate 
influence of on jurisdiction over another.  Unforeseen variables will always exist 
that make complete preparation for operating in this type of environment 
impossible.  An evaluation of this model simply depends on whether or not it is 
believed that the benefits outweigh the risks. 
B. INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE 
The existing JPA has served the county well for a very long time.  There 
are many areas of the agreement that are very useful and productive.  However, 
as discussed above, the agreement’s exclusion of relevant partners and its 
reluctance to evolve with changing needs and capabilities has diluted its 
effectiveness. A revision of the JPA is required and an evaluation the following 
policy options may facilitate a greater relevance and effectiveness. 
1. Special Districts 
a. Policy Option One 
The Emergency Services Council shall maintain the status quo 
effectively excluding special districts from participating in the governance process 
(see Table 4). 
Table 4.   Special Districts Policy Option One 





Status Quo Poor Moderate Moderate Poor 
The short-term result to option number one may go unnoticed as 




the process and organization will likely result in an inability to make the 
necessary advances to prevent, mitigate, and respond effectively in the long 
term. 
b. Policy Option Two  
The Emergency Services Council should direct OES to take the 
lead in establishing a countywide commission tasked with overseeing the 
county’s special districts.  This group should be granted legitimacy and authority 
via the JPA and be comprised of an OES District Coordinator, a representative of 
the Emergency Services Council, and one representative from each of the 
county’s special districts.  This group will ensure that the appropriate special 
district coordinates with applicable municipalities including the active participation 
within each city’s EOC. 
Table 5.   Special Districts Policy Option Two 








Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
All measurable areas for Option Two are listed a moderate based 
on existing conditions.  For example, it is very likely that this option will be 
effective, but it may not be as effective as special districts holding a voting seat 
on the council.  This option can be viewed as an appropriate compromise 
increasing the fiscal impact and political feasibility from poor to moderate. 
c. Policy Option Three 
The JPA should be revised to mandate that OES takes the lead in 





and the county.  Following this revision, OES should be charged with annual 
review of these redundant systems.  The JPA budget must be adjusted to 
provide for adequate funding of this ongoing project. 
Table 6.   Special District Policy Option Three 









High Poor Poor Moderate 
The fiscal impact of this investment may prevent its implementation.  
Within the current environment, elected officials are likely to be unwilling to make 
an investment to build this type of system.  This decision may be appropriate at 
this point, but should be considered when deemed more acceptable. 
d. Policy Option Four 
The JPA should be revised to include a special district advisory 
committee comprised of an OES District Coordinator and a representative from 
each of the special districts.  While not a voting member of the council, the 
advisory committee should be included in the agenda of the council’s quarterly 
meetings.  The committee will have the authority to develop and present 
proposals to the Emergency Services Council.  Furthermore, prior to the passage 
of policy, all proposals will be submitted to the advisory council for review and 
feedback. 
Table 7.   Special District Policy Option Four 









High High Moderate High 
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There is no net cost associated with this option.  It allows for the formal 
participation of special districts and results in a much more thorough and 
collaborative process.  Political friction may exist when the agendas of different 
groups clash; however, this option presents a platform to address those issues 
with structure and process. 
e. Policy Option Five 
The JPA should be revised to include a special district 
representative as a voting member of the Emergency Services Council.  This 
representative will be elected by all contributing special districts to sit on this 
board.  Only those special districts contributing financially shall participate in 
selecting this member. 
Table 8.   Special District Policy Option Five 








Poor Poor Poor Moderate 
Option Five will likely create another large level of bureaucracy and cause 
the Special District to face obstacles in participating as an effective member.  It is 
unlikely that one representative can legitimately represent the interest of such a 
diverse group.  Furthermore, those depending on the services provided by 
special district may find themselves contributing an inequitable amount under a 
revised agreement.  For instance, one may contribute via the municipality one 




f. Policy Option Six 
The JPA should be revised to establish three to four hubs within the 
county to manage large-scale regional natural and manmade disasters better.  
This policy will require the cooperation of jurisdictions sharing borders and within 
close geographic proximity of one another.  Special districts will be include 
included in this process and be assigned to the appropriate hub based on the 
type of provided services and the geographic location that service is provided 
within the county. 
Table 9.   Special District Policy Option Six 








High Moderate Moderate High 
Option Six presents a model that is much more effective than the current 
system.  This option may face difficult political and fiscal challenges during 
development and implementation.  However, the long-term result will be a model 
in which funds and resources are managed and allocated in a much more 
efficient, effective, and risk based manner.  Should this option receive the 
necessary commitment upon implementation, sustainability should not be a 
problem. 
2. San Francisco International Airport 
a. Policy Option One 
The Emergency Services Council should invite SFO to join the JPA and 





Table 10.   SFO Policy Option One  





SFO as an 
Associate 
Member 
High Moderate Moderate Moderate 
This option is likely to enhance the county’s level of preparedness 
and response capabilities significantly.  Its financial impact is tied directly to 
political agendas.  Assuming some type of consensus is reached, this step would 
improve the effectiveness of the JPA. 
b. Policy Option Two 
The Emergency Services Council should seek input on the Airport 
Commission (San Francisco Charter) regarding policies and decisions that will 
directly affect the county.  This position should be identified and defined within 
the JPA. 
Table 11.   SFO Policy Option Two 









Poor Moderate Poor Moderate 
The likelihood of elected leaders in San Francisco to support a 
move like this is poor.  Furthermore, due to the political climate it is unlikely that 
any input provided by the Emergency Services Council would carry any weight. 
c. Policy Option Three 
The council should seek a liaison relationship with the city and 
county of San Francisco Board of Supervisors (San Francisco Muni Code) 
regarding decisions related to the airport.  This position should be defined and 
outlined within the existing JPA. 
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Table 12.   SFO Policy Option Three 








Poor Moderate Poor Poor 
This option faces the same challenges as Option Two.  The 
atmosphere within San Francisco politics will not likely allow such inclusion. 
3. Interoperable Communications 
a. Policy Option One 
Identify one member of the Emergency Services Council as the 
chair of the county’s interoperable working group and require all JPA members to 
assign a member to the same.   
Table 13.   Interoperability Policy Option One 










Moderate Moderate Poor Poor 
This option would provide the council with a vested interest in 
interoperability.  Additionally, it possesses the authority to mandate participation 
and compliance.  It will be met with a great deal of push back politically; however, 
this process would provide the cities with a voice to express not only objections, 





b. Policy Option Two 
Identify four members of the county’s interoperable working group 
to be assigned to the UASI based regional working group.  These assignments 
should be based on local within the county (i.e., north, central, and south) and 
one member from the Sheriff’s Office.   
Table 14.   Interoperability Policy Option Two 










Moderate Moderate Poor Poor 
This revision addresses two issues.  It will provide the county with 
an active role in the development of the appropriate form of regional governance.  
Additionally, it will expose city representatives to associated successes in other 
parts of the Bay Area.  This will likely, over time, dissipate any reservations 
associated with an interoperable system; however, it will experience the political 
struggles similar to that of Option Number One. 
c. Policy Option Three 
Establish a fund within the JPA budget to finance future 
interoperable projects.   
Table 15.   Interoperability Policy Option Three 





Interop Fund High Moderate Poor Moderate 
The same type of financing was just completed for a new $600,000 
Hazardous Materials Response Truck.  This document already provides for the 
funding of local mutual aid channels and is controlled by a representative from all 
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of the stakeholders within the county.  This investment affords control to those 
who are most impacted by this effort.  It contributes to enhanced local 
governance and subsidizes the associated costs for smaller municipalities. 
d. Policy Option Four 
Require the present law enforcement and fire mutual aid chiefs 
(assigned on a rotational basis) to provide regular communications updates to 
the council on a quarterly basis.   
Table 16.   Interoperability Policy Option Four  








Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
These chiefs already report out on mutual aid responses quarterly.  
The addition of this report would provide for accountability and measurable 
outcomes. 
C. FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The total combined contributions of the cities to the Emergency Services 
JPA come to approximately two million dollars annually (OES Budget, 2009).  
OES manages approximately 26 million dollars in grant funds each year (OES 
Memorandum, 2008).  In addition to their contributions to the JPA, many of the 
incorporated cities are spending considerable sums of money for services 
provided by special districts based on contractual relationships.  SFO is a 
tremendous revenue generator for San Mateo County.  Fees and taxes on fuel, 
licensing, and other goods and services have long been a matter of contention 
between the county and the city of San Francisco.  
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The factors described above make fiscal concerns the major obstacle 
standing in the way of a revised JPA that would include special districts and SFO 
as active members.  There are two components to this obstacle. 
The first hurdle addresses whether these entities should be required to 
contribute financially as part of the JPA.  Many cities have argued that special 
districts should contribute if they want to participate fully; however, this process 
may not be equitable for residents who already pay for and rely on the services 
these districts.  For example, if a city contracts with a fire district to provide fire 
protection services and both the municipality and fire district are contributing 
members to the JPA, then taxpayers in that city are contributing twice the amount 
of those who reside in cities that provide their own services.  Additionally, it is 
likely that municipalities will not grant special districts voting privileges.  Although 
districts would be eager to play a greater role, they would not be willing to enter 
into an agreement that calls for their financial support without adequate 
representation.  In the case of SFO, an argument can be made that its ongoing 
support within the county in the form of taxes and fees should grant it inclusion 
with no additional requirement for support.   
Should an agreement be reached where special districts would be willing 
to contribute financially to the JPA, specific guidelines must be developed within 
the agreement outlining this process.  This presents the second component of 
the fiscally based obstacle with regards to how these guidelines should be 
established.  There are many variables that may be considered including the size 
of the district, the type of service it provides, and its total contract amount with 
municipalities.  Inevitably, those districts required to make greater contributions 
will argue for a larger role within the process.  This will draw objections from the 
smaller more vulnerable districts.  Additionally, these decisions have a direct 
impact on the residents as contract costs will increase in proportion to 
contributions to the JPA.  
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The incentive to include the special districts as active members of the JPA 
can only be overcome if the municipalities acknowledge their value to the 
process.  However, there is no equitable and efficient manner to develop a 
contribution schedule for these districts.  Therefore, the current formula used to 
determine city’s contribution should be could include a small fee for the formation 
of the advisory committee described within this report.  In addition to population 
and property values, whether or not a city depends on a special district for 
services should be included as a variable.  This new formula could be mandated 
within a revised version of the JPA.   
Among local government the most intimidating factor in exploring 
interoperability is the involved costs.  The concept of enhancing communication 
capabilities is often discarded at the city and town levels based simply on the 
bottom line.  This is discouraging because it prevents even the discussion of 
what types of enhanced services are available.  Additionally, the conversation 
regarding alternative funding sources is never entertained.  For example, the Bay 
Area Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) has been active in promoting the 
federal effort to establish a public safety broadband network (Bay Area UASI, 
2009c).  Although there are difficult political considerations present that, this Bay 
Area effort is accompanied with significant federal funding.  The most recent 
opportunity is a 72.4 million dollar Broadband Technology Opportunity Program 
(Bay Area UASI, 2010c).  This project is aimed at supporting public safety 
applications during critical incidents and providing broadband connectivity for 
public access to underserved areas of the county as well as special districts and 
community colleges (Bay Area UASI, 2010c).  While the county is active in this 
program, the cities have shown no interest.  This is just one example of the 
dichotomy that exists among the priorities and direction of the cities and county. 
Via the Emergency Services JPA, the cities and county invested a total of 
$402,012 in 2009/2010 to maintain the existing four analog law enforcement 
mutual aid channels (OES Budget, 2009).  This cost is in addition to the 
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individual cost of each entity to maintain its own communications channels.  As is 
the pattern within the county, each city continues to act independently of one 
another and the county.  With the recent economic difficulties experienced by 
many cities, the concept of shared services has become fairly popular.  Among 
these discussions are proposals to consolidate 911 communication centers.  
While these efforts may be fiscally prudent, they are not accompanied by a move 
toward a coordinated maintenance of frequencies.  This type of coordination 
would likely lead toward future interoperability considerations. 
There is an acceptance among the cities within the county that future 
communication needs and requirements will require a move to a digital system; 
however, this acceptance is accompanied by a belief that this type of transition 
will be much more affordable in the future as technology continues to evolve.  
Although there is no guarantee, this belief may be true.  It has resulted in a “wait 
and see” strategy among the municipalities.  Unfortunately, these are multiple 
strategies as each entity prepares for the future independently.  The strategy has 
blinded local governments to the fact that they have fallen behind most of the 
region in their level of preparedness.  If their hypothesis is not found to be 
accurate, there will be a heavy price to pay down the road.  More importantly, 
there is no way to forecast when this capability will be needed to save lives and 
protect key resources.   
Similar obstacles accompany restructuring the county into three or four 
response hubs.  This step is accompanied by the possibility that officials from 
one jurisdiction may be placed in a position that requires policy decisions in a 
neighboring city.  This policy consideration also includes a financial impact.  For 
these policy decisions, especially when allocating resources, will result in 
significant costs.  Furthermore, the reimbursement under state and federal 
guidelines will be subject to great debate as the process for ordering and 
allocating resources is reviewed and scrutinized.   
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This obstacle may be overcome on two fronts.  First, the county already 
employs very effective mutual aid and automatic aid systems.  The effectiveness 
of these systems is based, in large part, on the establishment of a unified 
command consistent with the Incident Command System (ICS) principles (FEMA, 
2011).  A revision of the existing agreement to include a unified command within 
regional operations centers would alleviate many of the concerns associated with 
municipal autonomy and finances.  The second approach to deflecting resistance 
to a more coordinated response is the shared services approach.  Within these 
types of responses, municipal assets become regional assets.  This is not only 
cost effective, but it also allows cities to compile and stage resources 
collaboratively with a sense of purpose.  It is often difficult to predict what the 
need will be and where assets will be needed.  Instead of cities fending for 
themselves, they can work with neighboring jurisdictions to secure resources that 
are lacking regionally.  Additionally, these resources can be staged in a manner 
that makes their allocation and deployment much more effective and efficient. 
The financial structure of CDEMA does provide support for those smaller 
nations within the organization who may lack the resources of their neighbors in 
the region.  On the other hand, the existing county agreement punishes smaller 
cities in a sense.  Many smaller cities within the county have moderate 
populations and very high property values resulting in a significant required 
contribution to the JPA; however, some of these same municipalities are 
primarily bedroom communities that have no commercial tax base.  The end 
result is that the financial burden experienced by the cities is not truly 
proportionate.  The inclusion of special districts as members within the formal 
emergency response process could very well help to address this funding 
dilemma.   
D. TRANSITION AND PLAN TO EFFECT CHANGE 
Implementation of the aforementioned policy options requires a two-
pronged approach.  Some of the proposed JPA revisions require the 
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establishment of subcommittees within the Emergency Services Council.  
Representatives should be chosen by size and region to ensure adequate 
representation of all stakeholders.  Subcommittees should also include 
nongovernmental partners as associate or advisory members.  The findings of 
these bodies should be brought back to the Emergency Services Council for 
review and adoption.   
The proposed adjustment to the existing response structure should be 
evaluated by a working group comprised of emergency managers from each of 
the municipalities within the county.  This group already exists and meets 
quarterly to address regular smaller issues.  This group should be tasked with 
developing a footprint for how this structure should be adjusted.  The findings of 
this group should be submitted to CalEMA and FEMA to ensure compliance with 
SEMS and NIMS.  Upon approval from these agencies, this proposal should be 
presented to the Emergency Services Council for review and adoption. 
Along with fiscal factors, the diverse psychological make-up of the 
agreement and organization contribute to the adoption and implementation 
challenge.  Contributing to this atmosphere is the “resource crunch” discussed by 
Moghaddam in The New Global Insecurity (2010).  Significant inequalities exist 
among the participating municipalities and the special districts.  As a result, 
access to resources is extremely inconsistent.  The county finds itself with a 
regionalization dilemma that is similar to the globalization paradox presented by 
Moghaddam (2010, p. 80).  As the economies of municipalities grow and decline, 
resources continue to be consumed at an increasing rate leaving those with less 
facing an apparent continual spiral downward.  In contrast, those entities that 
enjoy a greater access develop a false sense of security and a reluctance to 
adapt to a changing environment.  The tendency to take care of immediate needs 





lines.  This failure is due to a lack of acknowledgement that security is based on 
regionalism and that incidents that occur in one area have a cascading effect on 
surrounding environments. 
Special districts are faced with particularly difficult dilemmas with regard to 
the concept of needs.  Necessities, such as support, linkages, and information 
(Clizbe, 2007, pp. 196–197), are not included in the equation when special 
districts are called upon in times of crises.  Their abilities to assess, coordinate, 
share information, and manage risk (Clizbe, 2007, pp. 198–199) are directly 
dependent on their relationships with local and regional governance.  To this 
point, these relationships are informal and tenuous.  The lack of strong 
relationships is based on a belief system among local entities that they must 
“take care of their own,” and any attempt to collaborate results in a relinquishing 
of control and an elevated risk.  This mentality prevents the community’s ability to 
respond to, and adequately recover from, both natural and manmade disasters. 
The basis for the reluctance described above bears a strong relationship 
to the concept of catastrophic evolution within intergroup contact (Moghaddam, 
2008, p. 96).  The idea of pre-adpativensss is the first component of this struggle 
(Moghaddam, 2008, p. 96). In this case, entities must develop a process that 
allows for a level of preparedness that includes collaboration with neighboring 
jurisdictions and nongovernmental organizations.  They must recognize the 
benefits of the ability to evolve in conjunction with an ever-changing environment.  
The evolutionary process will be heavily influenced, if not dictated, by the 
environments within adjacent communities. The second component is an 
evaluation of the speed of post contact adaptation (Moghaddam, 2008, p. 96).  
The rate at which a community will be able to adapt to the inclusion of another is 
entirely dependent on its preconditioned preparedness to do so.  Therefore, 
unless the municipalities and special districts are working collaboratively to 
prepare, the expectation of a cooperative response and recovery post incident 
will be extremely low. 
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From a practical perspective, the county must examine how it can 
overcome its own psychology of governance.  The inclusion of special districts 
provides for the opportunity to contribute to the county’s emergency planning 
process.  Their inclusion will advance the county’s preparedness due to a greater 
access to resources and the opportunity to collaborate with entities that possess 
an expertise and knowledge base that is not found in traditional county and 
municipal departments.  However, there is a “chicken and egg” dilemma here in 
addressing the psychology and belief system of all involved parties.  In order to 
move toward inclusiveness, a change in mentality must occur that includes a 
recognition and acceptance of the concept of regionalism.  The document and 
governance structure simply provides an avenue for legitimizing and legislating 
this new thought process. 
During emergency situations and critical incidents existing questions and 
ambiguities will be eliminated with a more structured process.  This approach will 
also decrease the level of competition for resources during a time of need.  
Furthermore, all entities will be better equipped to make emergency management 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The San Mateo County Emergency JPA continues to support the 
preparedness needs of the county.  However, the evolution of the manner in 
which public safety and additional core services are provided has made the JPA 
less relevant.  The shortcomings of the agreement must be recognized acted 
upon by the Emergency Services Council.  Among these concerns are 
interoperable communications, the inclusion of the many special districts within 
the county, and building a stronger relationship with the San Francisco 
International Airport.  A move to address these issues will face political 
challenges and financial obstacles.  The ultimate goal is to provide for the safety 
and security for the county’s residents.  The Emergency Services JPA can be an 
effective mechanism to work toward resolving these important issues.  The 
agreement is not perfect and in its current state is relatively ineffective. A revision 
of this agreement incorporating the implementation of organizational design 
principles will significantly increase its effectiveness. 
The interoperable issue is a challenging one.  This study identified just 
three areas of concern that contribute to the complexity of this problem.  The 
tendency is to address each level of the interoperable dilemma as a separate 
component requiring a unique and intricate solution.  It is likely true that each of 
the aforementioned areas must be approached with precise and specific solution 
alternatives; however, the larger picture must not be ignored.  To do so, simply 
adds to the topic’s complexity.  In San Mateo County there is an avenue 
available to address each of the three contributors discussed in this study.  The 
Emergency Services JPA can be an effective mechanism to work toward solving 
the county’s interoperable problem.  The following revisions to this agreement 
would make it the interactive and dynamic tool necessary to increase the 




Table 17.   Interoperable Communications Policy Options 
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Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
A qualitative analysis of the data with regard to the county’s interoperable 
communications reveals a couple of viable options.  The establish of a 
interoperability fund will contribute to cities be isolated in the future when 
addressing costly and immediate communication needs.  Monitoring the county’s 
progress via law and fire executives strengthen the sustainability and provide a 
foundation for a more active approach in the future. 
The date regarding the inclusion of special districts provides similar 
guidance. 
Table 18.   Special Districts Policy Options 










Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
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High Moderate Moderate High 
This data suggests that the county JPA should formally recognize the 
position of special districts and other nongovernmental organizations within 
emergency management in the capacity of a special commission.  Furthermore, 
the agreement should clearly and accurately define the roles of these entities and 
their partnerships with local governments and public safety agencies throughout 
the county.  As established by the CDEMA, the county should establish a 
regional approach to disaster management identified as three to four hubs.  
These hubs should be headquarters geographically in the county’s largest cities 
and include applicable special districts and nongovernmental organizations. 
SFO presents a more unique challenge than other special districts with 
less available options.   
Table 19.   San Francisco International Airport Policy Options 









High Moderate Moderate Moderate 
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Poor Moderate Poor Poor 
Due to its size, impact on the county, and affiliation with a major 
metropolitan city, the airport should be sought as an active homeland security 
and disaster response partner.  The Emergency Services Council should invite 
SFO to join the JPA and include the facility as an associate member of the 
emergency services council.  This is the only viable option at this point.  It would 
be unrealistic to seek input on the Airport Commission (SF Charter) or the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors (SF Muni Code); however, an emphasis should 
be placed on data sharing, intelligence, policy development, and decisions that 
will directly affect the county.  
Clearly defining the county’s relationship with SFO will improve both 
entities’ level of preparedness and security.  During emergency situations and 
critical incidents existing questions and ambiguities will be eliminated with a more 
structured process.  A daily benefit to both parties will be a structured manner in 
which information can be collected, shared, and analyzed amongst both entities.  
This approach will also decrease the likelihood that the county will be forced to 
compete with San Francisco for resources during a time of need.  Furthermore, 
both entities will be better equipped to make homeland security and emergency 
management decisions as all opinions and interests are addressed. 
It can be inferred that the JPA has the confidence of the cities within the 
county.  If it did not, it would not have survived for so long.  It serves as a funding 
source to alleviate existing countywide costs.  Finally, it provides for a solid 
platform from which an effective form of governance can be established for the 
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county’s emergency services and homeland security needs.  A review of this 
agreement provides the opportunity for the county to expand its communications 
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APPENDIX A. SAN MATEO COUNTY EMERGENCY SERVICES 
JPA MEMBERS 
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APPENDIX B. SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN SAN MATEO COUNTY 
Bay Area Water Supply and Conservation Agency  
Bayshore Sanitary District (San Mateo) 
Belmont-San Carlos Fire Department  
Broadmoor Police Protection District  
Coastside County Water District  
Coastside Fire Protection District  
Colma Fire Protection District  
East Palo Alto Sanitary District (San Mateo) 
Granada Sanitary District (San Mateo) 
Los Trancos County Water District  
Menlo Park Fire Protection District  
Mid-Peninsula Water District  
Montara Sanitary District (San Mateo) 
North Coast County Water District  
Peninsula Water Agency  
San Francisquito Creek Joint Powers Authority 
San Mateo County Resource Conservation District  
San Mateo County Transit District 
Sequoia Healthcare District 
Sewer Authority Mid-Coastside  
South Bayside System Authority 
West Bay Sanitary District (San Mateo) 
Westborough County Water District 
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APPENDIX C. KEY RESOURCE AND CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE AREAS USED IN DETERMINING RISK 
Agriculture and food 
Banking and finance 
Chemical 
Commercial facilities (lodging and resort) 
Commercial (public assembly) 
Commercial (retail and real estate facilities) 
Critical manufacturing  








Monuments and icons 
Nuclear 
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